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WHAT CAN WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT TELL US ABOUT
THE UK’S PRODUCTIVITY PUZZLE?*
Richard Blundell, Claire Crawford and Wenchao Jin
As in many European countries, labour productivity in the UK has been stagnant since the start of the
Great Recession. This article uses individual data on employment and wages to try to understand
whether real wage flexibility can help shed light on the UK’s productivity puzzle. It finds, perhaps
unsurprisingly, that workforce composition cannot explain the reduction in wages and hence
productivity that we observe, even compared to previous recessions; instead, real wages have fallen
significantly within jobs this time round. Why? One possibility we investigate is that the labour supply
in the UK is higher compared to previous recessions.
1. The Macroeconomic Context
The UK has recently experienced its deepest recession since the Second World War,
with real GDP falling by over 6% (see Figure 1). At the same time, there have been
substantially smaller falls in employment and hours – decreasing by just over 2% and
4% respectively – leading to falling output per worker and stagnating output per hour.
These changes are very different to what happened in previous recessions in the UK in
the late 1970s/early 1980s and the early 1990s. For example, Figure 2 shows that,
nearly five years later, real output per hour remains 3% lower than it was at the start of
the recession in 2008, while it was nearly 15% higher following the recession in the
early 1990s and nearly 13% higher following the recession in the early 1980s. This has
given rise to a so-called ‘productivity puzzle’ in the UK.
The aim of this article is to try to shed light on this puzzle. In a competitive economy,
one would expect individuals’ wages to reflect their marginal productivities, thus one
might anticipate changes in productivity to be correlated with changes in wages at
some micro level. Figure 3 provides some supportive evidence for this at the region
level during the recent recession, showing a clear positive correlation between changes
to average real hourly wages and changes to gross value added per hour between 2007
and 2011. The same is also true at the industry level and Crawford et al. (2013) also
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provide some suggestive evidence at firm level, showing that changes in labour costs
are able to explain a substantial proportion of the within-firm changes in productivity
that occurred in 2008–9.
At an aggregate level, Figure 4 shows that what has happened to average real hourly
wages is similar to what has happened to productivity during this recession, and
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Fig. 1. Changes to UK Output, Employment and Hours
Sources. Each of the three series is normalised to 100 at 2008 Q1 (quarter 0). Real output is based
on ONS series ABMI, which is real GDP seasonally adjusted; employment is based on ONS series
MGRZ, which is the total in employment aged 16 and over. Total weekly hours data come from
ONS series YBUS.
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
La
be
lle
d 
Qu
art
er 
Ind
ex
ed
 to
 10
0
Quarter Since the Start of Recession
2008Q1 1990Q2 1979Q4
Fig. 2. Changes to Real Output per Hour by UK Recession
Note. Each of the three series is normalised to 100 at the labelled quarter 2008 Q1, 1990 Q2 and
1979 Q4 (quarter 0). Sources for real output and hours are the same as in Figure 1.
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dramatically different from what has happened to wages (and indeed productivity)
during previous recessions. For example, in April 2011, average real hourly wages
(deflated using the Retail Prices Index; RPI) were 4% lower than they were at the start
of the recession in April 2008, compared to 5% higher in the early 1980s and 10%
higher in the early 1990s.1
Interestingly, however, the close relationship between what has happened to GDP
per hour and what has happened to real hourly wages that we have seen in the UK has
not been mirrored in other countries, even among those who have experienced similar
flat lining of labour productivity (see Figure 5). This is consistent with the idea that
productivity and wages have remained more closely linked in the UK than in other
countries, e.g. the US (Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2012). For example, in Germany –
where stagnating GDP per hour has been driven by increases in employment that have
outstripped increases in output wages have grown faster than productivity since the
start of the recession.2 The US, by contrast, saw real wage stagnation and rising labour
productivity. This suggests that the factors that might help to explain the stagnation of
labour productivity in the UK may not be the same as those that explain the stagnation
in other countries and suggests that further careful analysis of individual countries is
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Fig. 3. Changes to Productivity and Wages Across UK Regions, 2007–11
Sources. Per cent changes to wages come from authors’ calculation using the Labour Force Survey
by region of workplace. % changes to GVA/hour come from the ONS Regional Labour
Productivity revisions, available at http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/guide-method/method-quality/
specific/economy/productivity-measures/labour-productivity/gor-revisions.xls.
1 The magnitude but not the pattern of these differences would change if we used the Consumer Prices
Index (CPI) or the GDP deflator to deflate nominal wages. The corresponding figure using the GDP deflator
can be found in Disney et al. (2013). The CPI is not available before the early 1990s; it has gone up by 10.9%
between April 2008 and April 2011, compared to 9.55% for the RPI.
2 Germany’s working-age employment rate rose by almost 4 percentage points between 2007 and 2012.
This is a continuation of rising employment rates before 2007, which seem to have been driven, at least in
part, by the Hartz reforms, which reduced the generosity of unemployment benefits, tightened job search
conditions, and increased employer flexibility in terms of lay-off rules and mini jobs. The reforms are
considered to have reduced unemployment (Dlugosz et al., 2013; Krause and Uhlig 2012).
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required to understand what, if any, common drivers might help to explain the
anaemic productivity growth that we observe.
In this article, we maintain our focus on the UK, building on the growing literature
attempting to explain the UK’s productivity puzzle (Grice, 2012; Hughes and Saleheen,
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Fig. 5. Growth in Real GDP per Hour and Average Real Hourly Wages
Notes. Real GDP per hour for all countries and nominal hourly wages for all countries except the
UK come from OECDstats. Hourly wages are for the private sector only. Average hourly wages for
the UK are calculated from the Labour Force Survey for private-sector workers. All hourly wages
are deflated by GDP deflators from OECDstats.
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Fig. 4. Changes to Average Real Hourly Wages by UK Recession
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2012; Patterson, 2012; Goodridge et al., 2013; Pessoa and Van Reenen, 2013) by
focusing on wages rather than productivity as the outcome of interest, and examining
three potential explanations for why wages (and hence productivity) have fallen so
much during this recession compared to previous recessions in the UK.
One obvious possibility is that effective labour supply is substantially greater during
this recession than in the past: the labour supply curve has shifted to the right. We
know that the population of working age has increased substantially over the last
30 years – from 35.4 million in 1981 to 40.5 million in 2011 (http://www.neighbour
hood.statistics.gov.uk/HTMLDocs/dvc1/UKPyramid.html. – a substantial proportion
of which is due to net migration.3 This would mean that there are more individuals
willing to work at any given wage and thus that there is likely to be greater competition
for jobs. This might mean that workers have lower reservation wages than in the past
and that they attach more weight to staying in work (because their expected time to
find another job is longer than in the past) than on securing higher wages.
Section 2 provides some suggestive evidence that labour supply has indeed been
more robust in this recession than in previous recessions, particularly among older
workers (those aged 55–74). These patterns are consistent with recent changes to
welfare policy in the UK, such as the increasing number of welfare-to-work
programmes available to jobseekers, the more stringent job search conditions attached
to benefits claimed by the unemployed, those with disabilities and lone parents, and,
more recently, the increase in the state pension age for women. Another potential
explanation for higher observed labour supply in this recession compared to previous
recessions might be that individuals have experienced substantial wealth shocks (or
shocks to expectations of their future income) as a result of the financial crisis that
mean they decide to work for longer. Section 2 provides only limited support for this
hypothesis using a sample of older people in England but other studies (Crossley et al.,
2013; Disney and Gathergood, 2013) find stronger evidence.
To the extent that labour supply was higher among individuals with lower
productivity, firms may be able to employ more of these low-productive, low-paid
workers, or substitute them for more expensive workers or capital. Thus, one potential
cause of both low productivity and low wages at the aggregate level might be a
reduction in the average quality of labour. While we do not observe the quality or
productivity of workers directly, we can examine this composition hypothesis by
looking at the individual characteristics of the workforce over time.
Section 3 investigates how the composition of the UK workforce changed during this
recession compared to previous recessions. We would usually expect the composition
of the workforce to shift towards more productive workers during a recession, as a
reduction in aggregate demand would typically lead firms to lay off their least
productive workers first. This is exactly what we see during this recession too: based on
3 For example, between 2001 and 2011, just over half of the increase in total population in England and
Wales could be attributed to net migration. Authors’ calculations based on http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/
rel/pop-estimate/population-estimates-for-england-and-wales/mid-2002-to-mid-2010-revised–national-/sty
components-of-population-change.html. There is, however, relatively little evidence that higher immigra-
tion has lead to a reduction in wages among the native-born population (Dustmann et al., 2005; Manacorda
et al., 2012) and some suggestion that the effect on average wages might even have been positive
(Dustmann et al., 2013).
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the characteristics we observe, compositional changes should have increased produc-
tivity and average wages since 2008, and the magnitude of these changes appears to be
as productivity enhancing, if not more so, than in previous recessions. There is thus
strong evidence against the composition or quality-of-labour hypothesis as a potential
explanation for the reduction in wages and hence productivity that has occurred
during the recent recession in the UK.
This suggests that much of the change in wages must have occurred as a result of
decreases in the returns to particular characteristics and thus that we would expect
wages to have fallen significantly among individuals who remained in the labour
market. This is not particularly surprising, given that this group vastly outweighs those
who enter or leave the labour market from year to year in the UK. Changes in the
composition of the workforce may play a bigger role in countries which have had
higher labour turnover or more lay-offs since the recession, such as the US. In
Section 4, we will show that, among workers who stayed in the same job between 2010
and 2011, one-third experienced nominal wage freezes or cuts (12% experienced
freezes and 21% experienced cuts) and 70% experienced real wage cuts (when wages
are deflated using the RPI). Moreover, these experiences were felt across the wage
distribution. So the real question is: why have wages for existing workers been able to
fall so much in this recession compared to previous recessions?
Part of the explanation is that labour supply has been substantially higher – and
hence competition for jobs significantly greater – in this recession than in previous
recessions, as discussed above. This is consistent with the findings of Gregg et al.
(2013), who show that wages have become more responsive to local unemployment
rates since the early 2000s. Another likely factor is that the labour market is now
substantially more flexible than it was in the 1980s or 1990s. There has been a dramatic
decline in trade union membership over the last 30 years, which has reduced the
proportion of employees covered by collective bargaining. This appears to have made it
easier for employers to hold constant or reduce insiders’ wages: nominal wage freezes
were more prevalent in jobs without collective agreements and average wages have
fallen least among those covered by collective agreements at the national or industry
level. A third possibility is that employers are capturing a higher proportion of
economic rents now than in earlier periods.
A final piece in the puzzle – discussed extensively in Pessoa and Van Reenen (2013)
– is that the reduction in productivity might be driven by a reduction in the
capital–labour ratio as a result of an increase in the cost of capital (particularly for
small and medium-sized firms) or the continuing misallocation of capital to less
efficient firms or projects. There has certainly been a sharp reduction in busi-
ness investment over the course of the recent recession, which has been signifi-
cantly larger than in previous recessions (Benito et al., 2010) and among small and
medium-sized firms (Crawford et al., 2013). While Crawford et al. (2013) provide some
evidence that the reduction in investment can explain only a small proportion of
the within-firm changes in productivity in 2008–9, it is plausible that reductions
in productivity resulting from a fall in the capital–labour ratio also contributed to
reductions in real wages and hence labour costs, which Crawford et al. (2013) find to
be the primary driver of productivity falls.
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This article now proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents evidence on changes to
labour supply (and their determinants) over the short-term and longer term. Section 3
considers the extent to which changes to the composition of the workforce might
explain the fall in real wages that we observe. Section 4 documents and discusses
potential explanations for the substantial proportion of nominal wage freezes and cuts
that have occurred within jobs. Section 5 concludes.
2. How Has Labour Supply in the UK Changed Over Time?
This Section uses a range of individual-level micro-data to examine whether labour
supply has been higher or more resilient in the recent recession in the UK compared
to previous recessions. Appendix A offers a brief description of the key data sources
used in this analysis.
We start by comparing employment rates across recessions by gender, age group and
highest educational qualification. We also document what has happened in terms of
self-employment. We then move on to examine the drivers of increases in labour
supply for particular demographic or socio-economic groups, including older people
(those aged 55 and over) and lone mothers.
2.1. The Big Picture: Employment Rates
Figure 6 looks at what happened to the proportion of the working-age majority (those
aged 23–64) in work during and after the recessions starting in 1979, 1990 and 2008,
separately for men and women. This recession saw a smaller fall in the proportion of
men in work than in previous recessions, with 3% fewer men in work two years after the
start of the recession, compared to 6% after three years in the 1990s and nearly 10%
after five years in the 1980s. This pattern arises both from a smaller increase in the
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Fig. 6. Changes to the Employment Rates of 23–64-year Olds by Recession
Notes. No data point for 1980 or 1982. Quarter 2 is used for years since 1992.
Source. Labour Force Survey.
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proportion of men that are unemployed than in previous recessions and no change
(rather than an increase) in the inactivity rate.
In contrast to men, the pattern in terms of the proportion of women in work (and
participating in the labour market) does not differ dramatically across recessions,
although the proportion of women that are unemployed has been slightly higher in
this recession than in previous recessions. This picture does not change if we account
for the increasing labour market participation of women over time by taking a linear or
quadratic trend out of the employment time series.
Figure 7 analyses the changes in male employment rates in more detail, by showing
how different age groups have been affected over time. It is clear that most groups have
experienced smaller declines in employment in this recession compared to previous
recessions, but that this difference is particularly striking for those aged 55–64,
especially compared to the recession of the early 1980s. The more robust participation
rates among older men are also evident for those above state pension age, with the
employment rates of 65–74-year-old men continuing to rise over time.
Figure 7 also shows that the employment rates of young people tend to be hardest
hit during a recession, and Figure 8 brings this into sharp relief by comparing the
employment rates of those aged 16–22 and 23–64 through the first five years during
and after the recessions starting in 1979, 1990 and 2008. It emphasises that young
people’s employment rates do indeed fall substantially more than those of prime age
workers, but that, in line with the overall picture, the employment rates of young
people have fallen less in this recession compared to previous recessions: for example,
four years after the start of most recent recession, just over 6% less young people are in
work, compared to 11% less after the 1980s recession and 13% less than after the 1990s
recession. This may be partially (but not entirely) explained by higher education
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Fig. 7. Male Employment Rates by Broad Age Group
Notes. No data point for 1980 or 1982. Quarter 2 is used for years since 1992.
Source. Labour Force Survey.
© 2014 Institute of Fiscal Studies.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of the Royal Economic Society.
384 TH E E CONOM I C J O U RN A L [ M A Y
participation rates among young people in this recession than in previous recessions,
particularly among 16–17-year olds.
Finally, Figure 9 shows that, as is typical during a recession, employment rates fell by
more among lower skilled individuals than among higher skilled individuals. The
employment rate of those with less than 5 GCSEs at grades A*–C or equivalent (the
benchmark typically required for young people to continue beyond compulsory
schooling in the UK) fell by 5 percentage points between 2008 and 2012 (from 59% to
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54%), having never recovered following the 1990s recession. This compares with a
reduction of 4 percentage points among those with intermediate qualifications and
2 percentage points among those with a university degree or equivalent.
2.2. The Self-employed
It has been hypothesised that one reason why the proportion of individuals in work has
not fallen further during the most recent recession in the UK is because there has been
an increase in the proportion of self-employed workers with very low incomes, who may
be regarded as the ‘hidden unemployed’. It is certainly the case that a substantial
proportion of workers are self-employed: Figure 10 shows that this Figure is at an
historical high (of 14% in 2012 according to the ONS figures and 13% in 2010
according to the Family Expenditure Survey (FES)).
Figure 11 also shows that there has been an increase in the proportion of self-
employed workers who earn less than employees at the lower end of the earnings
distribution (on various measures) since 2008. Thus, while the pro-cyclicality of self-
employment earnings is to be expected, an increase in the proportion of low-paid self-
employed workers – particularly at a time when average real hourly wages are falling –
provides some suggestion that an increasing proportion of self-employed workers
would be better off as employees and thus that at least part of the reason why they are
self-employed may be because they cannot find appropriate employment. It is not clear
that this is happening to a greater extent now than in previous recessions though.
2.3. The Older Generation
We saw in Figure 7 that the proportion of 55–74-year-old men in work had been
broadly flat or even increasing over the course of the recent recession. Figure 12 shows
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how this is broken up into employment and self-employment for men, and presents the
same breakdown for women in this age group as well. It shows that the overall picture
for men is driven by a fall in the proportion in employment (of similar magnitude to
that for prime age men) and a rise in the proportion that is self-employed. The
proportion of 55–74-year-old women in self-employment has also risen since 2007 and
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Fig. 11. Proportions of Self-employed Individuals with Low Self-employment Income
Notes. The first two thresholds are the 10th percentile and the 20th percentile of the non-zero
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there has been a less marked decline (and even a small overall increase) in the
proportion in employment over the same period.
Some of the increase in labour market participation among older people can
potentially be explained by the increase in the state pension age for women from 60
towards 65, beginning in the second quarter of 2010. Figure 13 uses estimates of the
impact of the policy from Cribb et al. (2013) to calculate counterfactual employment
rates for men and women – i.e. what we would have expected their employment rates
to look like in the absence of the policy – and compares this to the actual employment
rates observed. It shows that the raising of the state pension age accounts for almost the
entire rise in employment rates among 60–64-year-old women since 2010, and a smaller
proportion of the rise in male employment rates as well, as the partners of some
affected women seem to delay their retirement as well.
Overall, however, the raising of the state pension age for women can explain only a
small proportion of the aggregate rise in labour supply among older people. As we saw
in Figure 12, employment and self-employment rates, particularly for women, held up
reasonably well throughout the recession, even before the policy was introduced in
2010 (although this could potentially be at least partially explained by anticipation
effects). More importantly, employment rates among women who are already above
state pension age – and are thus unaffected by this policy – have also risen since 2008.
Figure 14 shows that this increase has been particularly strong among 65–69-year olds.
Another plausible explanation for the increasing employment rates among older
people may be that they are supplying more labour in response to unexpected wealth
shocks (and/or lower expectations of future income from assets) as a result of the
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financial crisis. Banks et al. (2012) estimate the effect of the financial crisis on the
finances of those aged 50 plus using the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA).
They document the magnitude of changes to observed housing and financial wealth
between the Wave 3 and 4 interviews (which took place in May 2006–August 2007 and
June 2008–July 2009) and also attempt to simulate the magnitude of shocks to housing
and risky financial assets that respondents might have experienced between the height
of the boom (May 2007) and the depth of the recession (March 2009), as well as
between the Wave 3 and Wave 4 interviews.4 Housing wealth shocks were simulated on
the basis of self-reported house value in Wave 3 and regional house price indices,
whereas shocks to risky financial assets were estimated on the basis of holdings of risky
financial assets and defined contribution pensions in 2006–7 and two stock market
indices (FTSE).
Crawford (2013) looked at the impact of these different measures of wealth shocks
on retirement intentions. We build on her analysis to look at the labour supply of older
individuals. We focus on the simulated peak-to-trough shocks calculated by Banks et al.
(2012), as they have the advantage of measuring the change in assets over a fixed
period of time for all individuals and are likely to capture the largest change that
households might have experienced as a result of the financial crisis; the downside is
that they rely only on differences in initial asset holdings, plus regional variation in
house prices and national variation in stock market indices to generate variation in the
magnitude of the shocks experienced by different households. As a robustness check,
we, therefore, use the Wave 3 to Wave 4 simulations as well, which have the advantage
of introducing additional variation on the basis of differences in the timing of the
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Fig. 14. Changes to Employment Rates among Older Women Relative to 2007 Q4
Note. ‘In work’ includes both employment and self-employment.
Source. Quarterly Labour Force Survey.
4 These two periods overlap to a large extent. For most respondents, the Wave 3 interviews took place a few
months before May 2007 and the Wave 4 interviews took place a few months before March 2009.
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interviews, at the expense of moving away from changes observed over fixed periods
which may not fully capture the change in assets experienced over the course of the
recession.
We focus on individuals aged 55–74 and document the relationship between
simulated peak-to-trough changes to housing and financial wealth, and subsequent
labour supply. Specifically, we investigate whether variation in the magnitude of
changes to wealth (relative to initial asset holdings) can help to explain differences in
employment status in 2010–11 (Wave 5), conditional on employment status in 2006–7
(Wave 3) and a range of other individual characteristics.
Table 1 reports the results from a series of regressions run using a linear probability
model. Estimates from a Probit regression model (not reported here) show a similar
pattern to those obtained from a linear probability model. In each regression, the
outcome is whether an individual is in paid work (including self-employment) in 2010–
11, and the key covariates of interest are dummy variables indicating the quintile of the
distribution of relative changes to financial wealth (first three columns) or housing
wealth (second three columns) into which the individual falls. In each case, the analysis
Table 1
Effect of Simulated Changes to Housing and Financial Wealth on Employment Status
Simulated change to financial wealth:
May 2007 to March 2009
Simulated change to housing wealth: May
2007 to March 2009
% change
Effect of change on
employment in 2010–11
% change
Effect of change on
employment in 2010–11
Men Women Men Women
Bottom quintile:
most negative
change
10.5 0.033 0.060*** 10.5 0.142*** 0.090**
(0.025) (0.021) (0.050) (0.0398)
Second quintile 3.5 0.032 0.010 7.4 0.124*** 0.080**
(0.023) (0.021) (0.046) (0.0386)
Third quintile 1.1 0.016 0.021 5.7 0.133*** 0.051
(0.024) (0.020) (0.044) (0.039)
Fourth quintile 0.0 (omitted) (omitted) 4.0 0.0605 0.054
(0.045) (0.039)
Top quintile: least
negative change
(reference
category)
0.0 (omitted) (omitted) 0.5 (omitted) (omitted)
Observations 4,286 1,947 2,339 4,205 1,911 2,294
R2 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.51
Notes ‘% shock’ shows simulated shock as a proportion of initial total wealth, averaged within the quintile as
defined by the proportional shock. Regressions are run separately by gender. Controls include whether the
person was in work, looking for work, or inactive in 2006–7, quarter of interview in 2006–7 and 2010–11,
dummies for 5-year-age-band in 2010–11, and individual characteristics measured in 2006–7: highest
qualification, marital status, whether the person reports a long-term illness, a work-limiting illness, a
temporary illness, whether the person owns their home outright or with a mortgage, or whether they rent,
household size, whether has children and whether they think they can rely on the children. The sample for
looking at housing wealth is smaller than that for financial wealth because some people have moved across
regions between wave 3 and wave 4. It is not clear which regional house price trend would affect them, so they
are excluded from analysis of housing wealth changes. Robust standard errors are reported in brackets.
***indicates significance at the 1% level, **at the 5% level and *at the 10% level.
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is run separately for men and women, and the omitted category is those who
experience (or are simulated to experience) the smallest negative wealth shocks as a
proportion of their total wealth.
Table 1 shows that there was considerable variation in the magnitude of changes to
financial and housing wealth that we might have expected ELSA cohort members to
face on the basis of regional or national trends, given their initial wealth. For example,
from peak-to-trough changes (May 2007–March 2009), among the fifth of the sample
who were hardest hit, the simulated financial wealth shock amounted to a fall of 10.5%,
on average, while two-fifths of the sample experienced no change in financial wealth.
The relevant range in terms of housing wealth shocks was from 10.5% among the
20% worst affected to 0.5% among the 20% least affected.
Despite the relatively large simulated changes to financial wealth between 2007 and
2009, however, we find no evidence that these changes affect the likelihood of being in
work two years later. By contrast, the estimated effects of simulated housing wealth
changes are significant for both genders. For example, relative to men who were
among the 20% of the sample whose housing wealth decreased least as a share of initial
total wealth, men in the 20% of the sample who lost most were 14.2% significantly
more likely to be in work in 2010–11, compared to 12.4% more likely for the next 20%
and 13% more likely for the middle quintile. The estimated effects are smaller for
women, but still significant among the hardest hit 40%. It seems intuitive that older
people may be more inclined to work for longer if their house loses value and if
housing accounts for a larger share of their total wealth. This is consistent with the
findings of Disney and Gathergood (2013), who used data from the British Household
Panel Survey between 1991 and 2009 and found a large impact of housing wealth on
labour supply, especially among younger workers and older men.
Our estimates imply a sizeable labour supply elasticity with regard to housing wealth
of more than 1 for men and just below 1 for women. If people had been expecting
no nominal change to their housing wealth (on average), then these estimates would
translate into an aggregate employment effect of negative housing wealth shocks of
around 5% on 55–74-year olds.5 However, it seems likely that people would have
expected house prices to appreciate in nominal terms, in which case 5% would
underestimate the resultant positive employment effects.
The estimated relationship between housing wealth and labour supply is not robust
to variation in the measures used to capture changes in wealth, however. We repeated
the analysis using two alterative measures of wealth changes, the results of which are
reported in Appendix Tables B1–B2. The first alternative measure is the simulated
wealth shock between Wave 3 and Wave 4. The second alternative measure is actual
changes to wealth between Wave 3 and Wave 4. The estimated relationship between
changes in housing wealth and labour supply using these measures point to near-zero
(or even negative) effects of housing wealth changes on employment.
The contrast between our main estimates and those based on Wave 3 to Wave 4
simulated housing wealth shocks is particularly surprising, given that the only
difference between the two measures is the time period. One possibility is that our
5 The average fall in housing wealth between May 2007 and March 2009 experienced by 55–74-year olds in
ELSA was 5.3%.
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main measure relies too heavily on regional variation in house prices, which could be
highly correlated with differential employment opportunities across regions. This
seems unlikely, however, as the regions with the most resilient house prices (e.g.
London) are also the ones which saw more of an increase in employment over this
period. We thus remain cautious about the strength of the relationship between
housing wealth shocks and employment among older people.
2.4. Welfare Recipients
A number of changes have been made to the welfare system in the UK in recent years
in order to try to encourage various groups of claimants to start or return to work.
These reforms have generally been of two types: the first set of reforms has tried to
strengthen the work incentives of various groups; for example, the Working Families
Tax Credit was introduced in 1999 and has subsequently been reformed multiple
times, most recently transforming into the new Universal Credit programme. The
second set of reforms has tried to impose greater conditionality on benefit claimants
who are out of work for various reasons. For example, a series of active labour market
measures targeted at the unemployed and known as the ‘New Deal’ began in the late
1990s. Similarly, the benefit available to individuals who are too sick or disabled to
work was reformed in 2008 introduce stricter work capability tests, plus job search
requirements as a condition of continuing receipt for those who are deemed capable
of returning to work.6
Changes have also been made to the benefits that can be claimed by out-of-work lone
parents, a group whose labour supply is often found to be particularly sensitive to
welfare policies.7 Before November 2008, most lone parents who were not in work
could claim a benefit for those on low incomes with no job search conditions attached
(Income Support). To encourage lone parents to work, however, it is no longer
possible to claim Income Support if their youngest child is above a certain age limit.
This means that out-of-work lone parents with older children must instead claim
Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA), which is a benefit of equivalent value but that has strict
job search conditions attached. The age limit for youngest child was set at twelve in
November 2008 for all new claimants of Income Support and was lowered to ten in
October 2009, seven in October 2010 and five in October 2011. For lone parents who
were already claiming Income Support, the changes were phased in over a year from
the date of policy change for new claimants.
Figure 15 plots the change in labour market participation rates of lone mothers
since the policy change for the four groups of interest (split according to age of
youngest child), after taking out seasonal effects and a linear time trend.8 Figure 16
6 These changes were heralded by the switch from Incapacity Benefit to Employment Support Allowance
for new claimants in 2008. For further details of the old and new benefit regimes, see Browne and Hood
(2012).
7 For example, they are often the group found to be most responsive to childcare subsidies (Cascio, 2009;
Fitzpatrick, 2012) as well as the in-work support offered via tax credits (Blundell et al., 2000, 2008; Brewer,
2001; Blundell and Hoynes, 2004; Brewer et al., 2006).
8 For each group, we regress a binary outcome (e.g. employment) on three quarterly dummies and year
between 2001Q1 and 2012Q4. The Figure shows changes to residuals since the labelled quarter.
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Fig. 15. Lone Mothers’ Participation Rates since the Policy Change by Age of Youngest Child
Notes. Sample restricted to lonemothers aged between 20 and 54. The labourmarket participation
rates are de-trended as we regress participation rates on three quarterly dummies and year between
2001Q1 and 2012Q4 and plotting changes to the residuals.
Source. Quarterly Labour Force Survey.
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Fig. 16. Lone Mothers’ Employment Rates since the Policy Change by Age of Youngest Child
Notes. Sample restricted to lone mothers aged between 20 and 54. The employment rates are de-
trended as we regress participation rates on three quarterly dummies and year between 2001Q1
and 2012Q4 and plotting changes to the residuals.
Source. Quarterly Labour Force Survey.
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does the same for employment rates. Both participation and employment rates
appear to have increased strongly (by around 8–9%) among lone mothers whose
youngest child is aged 7–9 since the policy change occurred for this group. There are
relatively smaller changes for other groups, but in most cases participation rates are
higher than employment rates. More formally, Avram et al. (2013) evaluated the
impact of this policy on affected lone parents using a difference-in-differences
framework. They found that it increased employment rates by around 7 percentage
points three months after the policy started to bite and by 8–10 percentage points nine
months later. They also found larger effects on participation, as measured by the
number of lone parents estimated to have moved from Income Support to JSA,
although it is not possible to tell to what extent these new JSA claimants were actively
seeking work.
3. Can Changes to the Composition of the Workforce Help Explain Falls
in Productivity?
Section 2 provided some descriptive evidence that effective labour supply has been
greater (i.e. the labour supply curve has shifted to the right) in this recession than
in previous recessions, particularly among older people and certain types of welfare
recipients, such as lone parents. If such individuals were found to have relatively
lower productivity, on average, than the existing workforce, then it is possible that
the average productivity of the workforce could be lower in this recession than in
previous recessions as a result of the higher supply of low productivity types. The key
question here is not whether the workforce has shifted to less productive types
during the recent recession – in general, the workforce becomes more productive,
on average, during a recession, as firms are likely to sack their least productive
workers first – but whether the composition change has been more adverse (or less
positive) than in previous recessions. If this were to have been the case, then this
composition (or aggregate quality of labour) hypothesis might provide a potential
explanation for why labour productivity fell by more in this recession than in
previous recessions.
Assuming that individual wages proxy individual productivity, we can quantify
how much of the aggregate change in wages (and hence productivity) can be
explained by changes to the composition of the workforce (as measured by observed
individual characteristics, X, such as age and occupation) and how much is due to
changes to the parameter values associated with (or ‘returns’ to) particular charac-
teristics (e.g. education). To do so, we run separate wage equations at the start and
end of the period of interest and then carry out a simple Oaxaca decomposition, as
per (1):
Y^ 1  Y^ 0 ¼ b^1ðX 1  X 0Þ þ ðb^1 þ b^0ÞX 0 (1)
To investigate the extent to which the higher supply of less productive workers might
help to explain the fall in productivity during the recent recession, we run wage
equations in 2007 and 2012 using data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), which
contains a reasonably rich set of individual characteristics, including gender, age,
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education, family composition, nationality, region, industry, occupation and tenure.
Figure 17 presents the results of this analysis, and compares the results for 2007–12
with those over two recent boom periods: 1997–2002 and 2002–7.
Figure 17 shows that between 2007 and 2012, mean log wages fell by 5.3% in real
terms (i.e. the aggregate change was 5.3%). Of this, +3.3% could be explained by
compositional changes: in other words, on the basis of changes to the characteristics
of individuals in the workforce and the jobs that they do, we would have expected
wages to increase by 3.3%, all other things being equal.9 This is exactly what we
would expect to happen during a recession, and means that none of the aggregate
wage fall can be explained by changes to the composition of the workforce on the
basis of characteristics that we observe and hence must instead all be due to changes
to the parameter values associated with (or returns to) particular characteristics
instead.
Another way of saying this is that the vast majority of the change in wages must have
occurred among those who stay in work across periods, rather than because of flows
into or out of work. Given that those who remain in work from one year to the next
make up about 80% of the workforce in any given year, this is perhaps not surprising,
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Fig. 17. Decomposing Changes in Real Log Hourly Wages
Notes. Observations missing any individual characteristics are dropped from the analysis.
Regressions are weighted by the income weight in LFS. Age bands are 16–17, 18–24, 25–34, 35–
44, 45–54, 55–64, 65+. There are three categories of highest qualification: degree and equivalent,
secondary (e.g. A levels, A*–C GCSEs), and elementary/none. There are six categories for
number of kids, from 0 to 5+. Age of youngest child has 18 dummies. Nationality is controlled by
a binary indicator of whether the individual has UK nationality. Occupation has nine groups
according to SOC. Industry is at SIC 1992 section level.
9 One might expect the compositional effect to be more positive during recessions if lower skilled lower
paid workers are laid off first or hiring at the junior level stops but this does not seem to be the case here, as
the contribution made by changes to the composition of the workforce is approximately similar in 2007–12 as
it was on average over the preceding decade.
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and is exactly what we see in Figure 18, which plots year-on-year percentage changes in
average real hourly wages and decomposes this into the amount accounted for by flows
into employment, the amount accounted for by flows out of employment and the
amount accounted for by those who stay in employment.10
For this to help us understand why the labour market performance of this recession
has been so different to previous recessions, we would expect the picture presented by
these decompositions to vary by recession. To examine whether this is the case, we run
a series of Oaxaca decompositions for each of the recessionary periods of interest
(1980–3, 1990–3 and 2007–10) using data from the FES, the results of which are shown
in Figure 19. We use data from the FES because wages are not collected this far back in
LFS. The FES contains similar individual characteristics to the LFS but fewer job
characteristics. At the time of writing, the latest year for which FES data are available is
2010.
Figure 19 shows that the compositional effect in this recession is estimated to be
less positive than in previous ones, suggesting that a small part of the explanation for
lower real wages (and hence productivity) in this recession compared to previous
recessions may be the fact that the lowest productivity workers are exiting the labour
market to a lesser extent than in previous recessions. This difference is, however, very
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Fig. 18. Decomposition of Aggregate Year-on-year Real Hourly Wage Growth by Flows
Notes. Wages are deflated using the Retail Prices Index and are scaled to be consistent with
quarterly cross-sectional figures; however, we would get a qualitatively similar picture if we did
not apply such scaling.
Source. Labour Force Survey.
10 Mechanically, this can be calculated as: meanwaget  meanwaget–1 = [n3/(n3 + n2)](w3t  w2t) +
[n1/(n1 + n2)](w2t1  w1t1) + (w2t  w2t1). Where n1 is the number of people in work at time t  1
but out of work at time t, n2 is the number of people in work at both time t  1 and time t, and n3 is the
number of people who are not in work in t  1 but are at time t; w1, w2, w3 represent average wages of the
groups at specified time points.
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small relative to the difference in actual wage growth in each period. What is
strikingly different about this recession compared to previous ones is that the
parameters associated with (or returns to) individual characteristics have fallen
dramatically in this recession, while they remained strong and positive in previous
recessions. In other words, changes in the composition of the workforce make only a
very small contribution to the explanation of why real wages continued growing in
the recessions of the early 1980s and 1990s but stagnated in the current downturn;
instead we must try to explain why wages have fallen so dramatically among existing
workers in this recession.
4. What Has Happened to Nominal and Real Wages During the Recent
Recession?
This Sectiondocuments inmoredetailwhathashappened tonominal and realwagesover
the course of the recent recession and how this differs from previous recessions. It also
attempts to provide some potential explanations for the differences that we observe.
The first thing to note is that the reduction in average real hourly wages among
existing workers documented in the previous Section is not just being driven by
individuals being made redundant and having to take lower paid jobs: there is also
strong evidence of substantial nominal and real wage reductions occurring within jobs.
Figures 20 and 21 focus on individuals who are in the same job as one year ago
(which covers around 80% of workers throughout the period) and document the
proportions of individuals whose hourly pay was cut, frozen or increased compared to
a year ago in real terms (calculated using the RPI) (Figure 20) and nominal terms
(Figure 21).
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Fig. 19. Decomposing Changes in Real Log Hourly Wages, by Recession Period
Notes. Age, number of children and age of youngest child are accounted for in the same way as
described in Figure 17. Age when ceased education is controlled for by dummies for individual
years between 15 and 25.
Source. Family Expenditure Survey.
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Figure 20 shows that between 2010 and 2011, 70% of employees who stayed in the
same job faced real wage cuts, while Figure 21 shows that a third of those workers faced
nominal wage freezes or cuts (12% experienced freezes and 21% experienced cuts).
The last time that such a high proportion of workers faced real wage cuts was between
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Fig. 21. Percentage of Stayers Whose Nominal Wages Were Cut, Frozen or Raised
Note. Same as Figure 20.
Source. New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset 1975–2012.
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Fig. 20. Percentage of Stayers Whose Real Wages Were Cut, Frozen or Raised
Notes. Sample restricted to individuals being in the same main job in the coming year. The
labelled year refers to the base year. We have excluded observations whose gender, industry,
occupation or work area has changed despite claiming to be in the same job. Freeze defined as
|%change| < 0.1%
Source. New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset 1975–2012.
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1976 and 1977, when inflation exceeded 15%, while the proportions of nominal wage
freezes and cuts are the highest since the series began in the mid-1970s. Those
percentages of real cuts would have been lower if we had used another deflator
(such as the CPI or the GDP deflator) but the broad pattern would have remained
the same.
Moreover, these changes have occurred among a range of different types of workers
(e.g. by gender, age, occupation, industry and firm size) and across the wage
distribution. For example, Figure 22 shows that average hourly wages have fallen by
about 10% in real terms between 2009 and 2012 for those with higher education as
well as for those with low or no qualifications. Similarly, Figure 23 shows that
average real hourly wages have fallen by more among individuals at the top of the
distribution than among individuals in the middle and at the bottom of the
distribution in this recession, while in previous recessions wages continued to grow
for individuals at the top of the distribution. One important reason may be the falling
employment share of financial industries (a high-earning sector hit particularly hard
in this recession in the UK)11 and the slowdown of wage growth among those
remaining in that sector. Stagnation (rather than reductions) in wages at the bottom
of the distribution may be at least partly attributable to the floor introduced by
the minimum wage in 1999, which has been shown to have helped reduce
earnings inequality in the UK (Dolton et al., 2012). Figures B1 and B2 in Appendix
B also replicate Figures 20 and 21 for different quintiles of the wage distribution,
finding a similar pattern. As a result, earnings inequality has stagnated or even fallen
slightly during the recent recession, while it continued to increase during previous
recessions.
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Fig. 22. Average Real Hourly Wage by Highest Qualifications Achieved
Note. The sample is 16–59-year olds in the Labour Force Survey. Wages are deflated by the Retail
Prices Index and in 2012 prices.
11 ‘Financial and insurance activities’ accounted for 3.9% of total employment in 2013 Q2, compared to
4.4% in 2007 Q2. See ONS table EMP13 ‘All in employment by industry sector’.
© 2014 Institute of Fiscal Studies.
The Economic Journal published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of the Royal Economic Society.
2014] W AG E S , E M P LO YM EN T A ND TH E U K P U Z Z L E 399
It is also interesting to note that despite widespread discussion and acknowledge-
ment of public sector pay restraint, Figure 24 shows that average real hourly wages
(among workers who stay in the same job) have actually fallen faster in the private
sector than in the public sector over the last few years, such that the public–private
sector wage gap has increased substantially over this period.
Why are workers so much more likely to have experienced nominal wage freezes or
cuts during this recession compared to previous recession? One hypothesis that we are
able to test (at least to some extent) is that it is because the labour market is now
substantially more flexible than it was in the 1980s or 1990s. There has been a dramatic
decline in trade union membership over the last 30 years, from a peak of around
13 million members (37% of the working-age population) in the early 1980s to around
7.5 million (19%) in 2008.12 This decline has been accompanied by a reduction in the
proportion of employees covered by collective bargaining, which appears to have made
it easier for employers to hold constant or reduce insiders’ wages.
Figure 25 shows that year-on-year nominal wage freezes over the period 2008–12
were more prevalent in jobs without collective agreements, and that where pay awards
were agreed at the national, industry or organisational level, proportionally more
workers experienced small positive nominal wage growth.
Similarly, Figure 26 shows that average real wages have fallen least among those
covered by collective agreements at the national or industry level. Taken together,
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Fig. 23. The Distribution of Real Hourly Wages
Source. New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset, excluding employees whose pay was affected by
absence, those with non-positive hours or earnings, and overtime. Nominal wages have been
inflated to April 2012 prices using the Retail Prices Index.
12 Authors’ calculations using Achur (2011) for trade union membership and http://www.neighbour-
hood.statistics.gov.uk/HTMLDocs/dvc1/UKPyramid.html for working-age population.
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Fig. 24. Average Real Hourly Wages in the Public versus Private Sector
Note. Sample restricted to individuals being in the same main job in the coming year. The
labelled year refers to the base year. We have excluded observations whose gender, industry,
occupation or work area has changed despite claiming to be in the same job. Main job (i.e. job
that gives the highest weekly earnings) only. Wages are in April 2012 prices.
Source. Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2005–12 (unweighted). Main job (i.e. job that gives
the highest weekly earnings) only. Wages are in April 2012 prices.
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Fig. 25. Distribution of Year-on-year Nominal Hourly Wage Growth by Type of Collective
Agreement, 2008–12
Notes. For some employees with more than one job, we only look at the main job as defined by
gross weekly earnings excluding overtime. The sample is also restricted to employees being in the
same main job as the preceding year. Each of the six distributions pool together observations
from 2008 to 2012.
Source. Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.
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these patterns suggest that the decline in collective bargaining which has accompanied
rapidly falling trade union membership may have contributed to wage stagnation
during the recent recession and hence may help to explain why wages have fallen
further in this recession than in the past. This may also help to explain the differences
between public and private-sector pay shown in Figure 21. However, it is clear that
average real wages in 2012 were no higher than in 2005 even for workers protected by
national or industry-level collective bargaining. In other words, while the decline in
collective bargaining was a contributing factor, it is far from the main cause of the
aggregate wage falls since 2009.
5. Conclusions and Policy Implications
This article uses individual data on employment and wages to try to shed light on the
UK’s productivity puzzle. Overall, we show that the supply of workers in this recession is
higher than in previous recessions: the labour supply curve has shifted to the right.
However, despite the increase in supply occurring among groups towards the lower
end of the jobs market, there is strong evidence against the composition or quality-of-
labour hypothesis as a potential explanation for the reduction in wages and hence
productivity that we observe. By contrast, we find significant real wage reductions
among individuals who have stayed in the same job year-on-year, with around one-third
of workers experiencing nominal wage freezes or cuts between 2010 and 2011 and 70%
experiencing real wage cuts (on the basis of the RPI). So the real question is: why have
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Fig. 26. Average Real Hourly Wages by Type of Collective Agreement
Notes. Sample restricted to individuals being in the same main job as the preceding year. Main
job (i.e. job that gives the highest weekly earnings) only. Wages are in April 2012 prices. Each
data point is based on thousands of observations except the series ‘sub-national’, which has 180–
420 observations per year.
Source. Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2005–12(unweighted).
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wages for existing workers been able to fall so much in this recession compared to
previous recessions?
Part of the explanation is the higher labour supply that we observe in this recession.
We provide some evidence that a combination of policy changes and reductions in the
value of household wealth may have contributed to this. This means that there are
more individuals willing to work at any given wage and thus that there is likely to be
greater competition for jobs. As a consequence workers are likely to have lower
reservation wages than in the past and seem to attach more weight to staying in work
(because their expected time to find another job is longer than in the past) than on
securing higher wages and are thus willing to accept lower wages in exchange for
holding onto their job. This is consistent with the findings of Gregg et al. (2013), who
show that wages have become more responsive to local unemployment rates since the
early 2000s.
Another likely factor is that the labour market is now substantially more flexible than
it was in the 1980s or 1990s. There has been a dramatic decline in trade union
membership over the last 30 years, which appears to have made it easier for employers
to reduce insiders’ wages: nominal wage freezes were more prevalent in jobs without
collective agreements and average wages have fallen least among those covered by
collective agreements at the national or industry level. The fact that similar reductions
in trade union membership have occurred in other countries with very different
responses to the recent recession (e.g. the US), however, means that this cannot be the
whole story.
A final piece in the puzzle – discussed extensively in Pessoa and Van Reenen (2013)
– is that the reduction in productivity might be driven by a reduction in the capital–
labour ratio as a result of an increase in the cost of capital (particularly for small and
medium-sized firms) or the continuing misallocation of capital to less efficient firms or
projects. There has certainly been a sharp reduction in business investment over
the course of the recent recession, which has been significantly larger than in
previous recessions (Benito et al., 2010) and among small and medium-sized firms
(Crawford et al., 2013). While Crawford et al. (2013) provide some evidence that the
reduction in investment can explain only a small proportion of the within-firm changes
in productivity in 2008–9, it is plausible that reductions in productivity resulting from a
fall in the capital–labour ratio also contributed to reductions in real wages and
hence labour costs, which Crawford et al. (2013) find to be the primary driver of
productivity falls.
Thus, while it is impossible to tell the extent to which lower productivity is being
driven by lower wages or lower wages are being driven by lower productivity, obtaining
new insights into the drivers of the significant reductions in wages that we observe
among those who remain in the same job year-on-year would seem to be at the heart of
understanding the UK’s productivity puzzle.
Appendix A. Data Sources Used
The English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (ELSA) is a longitudinal data set of a representative
sample of 50-year olds and above in England. It contains a huge amount of information on
wealth, health, pension schemes, employment and other economic and social circumstances.
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ELSA began in 2002–3. This study uses linked ELSA 2006–7 (Wave 3) and 2010–11 (Wave 5), and
has a sample of more than 7,000 respondents.
The Family Expenditure Survey (FES) is a repeated cross-sectional survey focusing on
expenditures and incomes of households in the UK. In 2001, the FES was merged with the
National Food Survey (NFS) to create the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS). At the
individual level, the FES/EFS contains employment status, hours, incomes from different
sources and some demographic information. There are 5,000–9,000 adult respondents every
year.
The Labour Force Survey (LFS) is a survey of employment circumstances of households in
the UK. It started as a bi-annual survey in 1975, becoming annual from 1983 to 1991 and
quarterly since 1992 Q2. The survey contains detailed information on individual character-
istics such as education, ethnicity and household composition. Since the LFS became
quarterly, each respondent is interviewed at five consecutive quarters and in each wave one-
fifth of the households in the sample are replaced. The LFS contains around 100,000
individuals per quarter. Wages are surveyed in the first and the fifth interviews only, and from
1992 only.
The New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset (NESPD) is a large panel data set of earnings of
individuals in the UK. Broadly speaking, the sample frame contains all working individuals
whose National Insurance number ends in a particular pair of digits, so the same individuals
can be linked over time. The survey forms are sent to their employers and ask detailed
questions about hours, wages and pensions arrangements. There is little information on
individual characteristics. The NESPD combines the New Earnings Survey (1975–2003) with
the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (ASHE, 2004–11). The sample size is around
150,000 every year.
Appendix B. Additional Tables and Figures
Table B1
Effect of Simulated and Actual Changes to Financial Wealth on Employment Status
Simulated change:
Wave 3 to Wave 4
Actual change:
Wave 3 to Wave 4
% change
Effect of change on
employment in Wave 5
% change
Effect of change on
employment in Wave 5
Men Women Men Women
Bottom quintile: most
negative change
4.8 0.003 0.042 13.4 0.015 0.003
(0.035) (0.035) (0.024) (0.023)
Second quintile 0.9 0.028 0.030 1.4 0.005 0.007
(0.034) (0.033) (0.024) (0.023)
Third quintile 0.2 0.006 0.006 0.0 0.048* 0.043*
(0.033) (0.033) (0.027) (0.023)
Fourth quintile 0.0 0.036 0.018 0.9 0.010 0.028
(0.035) (0.032) (0.028) (0.025)
Top quintile: least
negative change
(reference category)
0.6 (omitted) (omitted) 23.2 (omitted) (omitted)
Observations 4,286 1,947 2,339 4,286 1,947 2,339
R2 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.51
Note. See notes to Table 1.
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Table B2
Effect of Simulated and Actual Changes to Housing Wealth on Employment Status
Simulated change:
Wave 3 to Wave 4
Actual change:
Wave 3 to Wave 4
% change
Effect of change on
employment in Wave 5
% change
Effect of change on
employment in Wave 5
Men Women Men Women
Bottom quintile: most
negative change
5.7 0.012 0.007 20.4 0.005 0.004
(0.0344) (0.030) (0.027) (0.023)
Second quintile 2.8 0.008 0.0003 3.5 0.020 0.008
(0.030) (0.027) (0.026) (0.023)
Third quintile 0.3 0.054* 0.024 0.0 0.039 0.007
(0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.024)
Fourth quintile 0.6 0.073*** 0.029 2.3 0.045 0.028
(0.028) (0.025) (0.029) (0.027)
Top quintile: least negative
change (reference category)
3.1 (omitted) (omitted) 17.6 (omitted) (omitted)
Observations 4,205 1,911 2,294 4,205 1,911 2,294
R2 0.52 0.512 0.519 0.512
Note. See notes to Table 1.
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Fig. B1. Percentage of Stayers Facing Real Wage Cut in the Coming Year by Current Wage Quintile
Notes. Sample restricted to individuals being in the same main job in the coming year. The
labelled year refers to the base year. We have excluded observations whose gender, industry,
occupation or work area has changed despite claiming to be in the same job.
Source. New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset 1975–2012. There are 20,000–30,000 observations
underlying each data point.
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